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1 The Problem
As a white male from a middle class, Christian, classical-liberal, contemporary- 
conservative background I am a perfect example of the person to whom the 
ideology of North American law should be wholly invisible. For want of a better 
name, I shall call myself and others like me “white-guy liberals”, or WGLs for 
short. WGLs view race, gender, economic background (we don’t believe in class), 
language, culture, sexual orientation and the like as being relevant to legal 
education only as personal factors making it more, or less, difficult to learn what 
are assumed to be the neutral, ideology-free techniques and procedures of the law. 
That the basic assumptions and techniques of law are not neutral — equally 
representative, available, and useful for everyone — is not likely to occur to us. 
The content of law may at times be strange, wrong-headed and even perverse, but 
we see the basic structure as an extension of ordinary human reason and a 
“natural” view of society. Ideology is what Communists and other radicals have; 
open-mindedness and truth are what we have. How then, can I say anything even 
remotely useful in this seminar? In the eyes of critical theorists of law I was born 
to the power and privilege of defining the standard against which all “others” are 
measured.
Until fairly recently people with my background have had something important 
to say about diversity, justice and the law. The liberal ideals arising from the 
Greek and Roman Stoic tradition include what has come to be called the rule of 
law: political power is to be exercised through law, and the same laws apply in the 
same way to everyone. Historically this ideal has been far from realized in 
Western societies. Even within the past two hundred years people of various 
descriptions have been considered property, infantalized into political and 
economic impotence, barred from knowledge and education, denied the right to 
control their own bodies, prevented from practising professions for which they 
were qualified, assumed to be unreliable witnesses in court, and so on. Yet within 
the Stoic/liberal tradition these practices must be considered unjust, for they 
differentiate legal status according to criteria unrelated to the only bases for full
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participation in law and politics: the capacity for reason, and its exercise in 
purposeful action.1
WGLs, then, could seek justice and social reform by being true to the 
fundamentals of their perspective. They need not step outside that perspective or 
question its neutrality. All but the most radical and impatient critics must admit 
that this approach has served society. The demand for consistency in the 
application of Stoic ideals provided a powerful intellectual base for abolishing 
slavery and apartheid, enfranchising all adults and dismantling a considerable 
number of discriminatory practices and laws.2 WGLs could feel satisfaction, and 
occasionally even a bit of pride, at the accomplishments of the civil rights 
movement of the 60s and the women’s rights movement of the 70s. These 
movements were not led by WGLs, but they resonated with WGL ideals. The 
outcomes may have tested the WGLs’ sincerity — remember Spencer Tracy in 
Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner? — but those who proved pure of heart could 
accommodate the changes. If women and blacks were willing to play by the rules, 
what harm could there be? Women and “minorities” in law school are not a
^ though  many thinkers have had exceedingly elevated notions of reason, this is unnecessary for 
Stoic strategies to take root. Reason can be considered anything from the “divine spark”, and our 
participation in God’s divine order, down to a rather homely capacity to choose goals and 
strategies by considering and being guided by reasons. From the perspective of utilizing Stoic 
thought the basic questions are: 1) whether a being can think about what s/he should do, what 
s/he desires and how s/he can achieve these things; 2) whether her thought about these things is 
influenced to a meaningful degree by reasons; and 3) whether her behaviour is influenced to a 
meaningful degree by these thoughts. We need not be calculating machines or purely “rational 
men”, although the great thinkers had a clear preference for this purity. The tradition tends to 
make reason an all-or-nothing capacity, but those of us who reject such a view might nevertheless 
use Stoic patterns of argument: If a being can reason about good and evil, and act accordingly, 
they should be accorded equal status within a moral, political or legal community.
Scholars frequently appeal to economic and other social forces rather than ideas as the best 
historical explanations of the abolition of slavery in Europe and North America. While I do not 
claim that these analyses are incorrect, I believe it is unnecessarily short-sighted to suppose that 
the climate of ideas created and expressed by Stoicism, Christianity, liberalism, contractarianism, 
the American revolution, the French revolution, and a host of liberal thinkers was a mere 
epiphenomenon. Long ago Stoic thinkers had no doubt that slavery was contrary to the “natural 
law”. A millennium and a half before the abolitionist movement reached fruition Stoic ideals of 
equality based on reason were absorbed into what we know as Christianity. This provided at least 
part of the intellectual backdrop against which the abolitionist battle was fought. A recurring 
theme of pro-slavery rhetoric from the time of Aristotle onward was the claim that slaves are 
simply incapable of taking care of themselves, incapable of thinking (reasoning) and controlling 
themselves to the extent necessary for a life of freedom. Domination was thus made to appear as 
benevolent paternalism. Whatever economic and other forces were operating, it is but doctrinaire 
positivism to insist that rejection of this argument by people of conscience had no effect on human 
attitude, resolve and action in the abolitionist struggle. The Stoic, Christian tradition provided at 
least part of the conceptual structure in which the politics were played out. Similar things can be 
said about the struggle for the vote, civil rights movements, and so on. Historical explanations 
which exclude moral thought and ideals are as suspect as those which consider nothing else.
problem as long as they do the work and meet the standards expected of everyone 
else. Politically and educationally, “colour” in the WGL classroom is like colour 
in the natural world for the classical empiricist: a purely secondary quality existing 
“in the mind” rather than “in the world”.
By the mid 1970s the faces in class were beginning to look different but the 
WGL law professor could continue on more or less as before, secure in his 
understanding and mission. Law was law and teaching was teaching. Students 
were, after all, just students, however unusual their appearance, speech and 
opinions. They still came to law school “with a head full of mush” and his task 
was to see that they left “thinking like a lawyer”.
A decade later the WGL law professor was under siege. His curriculum, 
syllabi, casebooks, textbooks, teaching techniques, expectations, and even language 
were called elitist, dassist, sexist, racist and Goddess knows what else. From being 
the defender and purveyor of justice, equality and harmony, he had become the 
instrument of oppression and injustice, a speed bump on the highway to the 
promised land. His deeply held views of justice and equality were dismissed not 
only as yesterday’s solutions, but worse yet, as today’s problems. If he could not 
be re-educated out of his problematic liberalism by public embarrassment, 
consciousness-raising workshops or devoted private study of the new non-canon, 
he should tread softly and retire early. The day of the WGL in law school was 
past.
What I propose to do in this brief essay is consider the extent to which the 
intellectual tradition out of which the white-guy liberal comes has reached the end 
of its resources. To what extent can I, as a WGL, draw upon the tradition out of 
which I come to help me find my way in the newly diverse classroom? Does the 
Stoic/liberal Western tradition of law have anything but opposition left to offer the 
struggle for justice in diversity?
2 The Critique of WGL Rationalism
The most prominent feature of the Western legal, moral and political tradition is 
its use of the ancient Greek rationalist, scientific model. In particular, the 
tradition has relied heavily on treating legal, moral, political persons as abstract 
variables, and law as a rational system regulating the interactions among these 
abstract persons. Legal equality consists in abstracting legal persons — who are 
equal in all relevant ways — from concrete, unique individuals who are frequently 
unequal in power, position, ability, etc. Justice consists of treating these legal 
persons with consistency in a rational system of laws.
As Marxists have pointed out, this approach perpetuates the actual inequalities 
among concrete, particular, non-abstract people. Describing the first phase of 
Communism, Lenin put it this way:
“Equal right,” says Maix, we indeed have here; but it is still a “bourgeois right,” 
which, like every right, presupposes inequality. Eveiy right is an application of the 
same measure to different people who in fact are not the same are not equal to 
one another; that is why “equal right” is really a violation of equality and an 
injustice. ...But different people are not alike: one is strong, another is weak; one 
is married, another is not; one has more children, another has less, and so on. 
“...With equal labour — Marx concludes — and therefore an equal share in the 
social consumption fund, one man in fact receives more than the other, one is 
richer than the other, and so forth. In order to avoid all these defects, right 
instead of being equal must be unequal.”3
Marx’s solution, unequal right, strikes at the very heart of the rationalist model, 
for it entails treating citizens or legal persons differently under the law, which is 
the very essence of injustice.4 Within the scientific model, entities which are 
essentially identical are equally and indistinguishably governed by the same natural 
“laws”. A scientific, rational system of law must likewise treat all legal persons 
equally or indistinguishably within the law. Such a society is just when its laws 
form a coherent system and apply equally, and in the same way, to all people or, 
more precisely, to all people who qualify as legal persons or citizens.
Radical feminists take this critique one step further, arguing that not only does 
abstract equality frequently ensure concrete inequality, but it also renders invisible 
“real” systems of inequality, power, hatred and domination which operate outside 
(beneath? behind?) the rational system of law and politics. Patriarchy, class 
oppression, racism, heterosexism and similar systems of domination do not depend 
on liberalism or rationalism for their fundamental concepts, values and processes.5 
As a result they can use rational social organization to their own ends without 
being dependent or wholly determined by any rational social system. Liberal 
equality and justice are not only consistent with real differences in power between 
women/blacks/workers-as-a-group and men/whites/capitalists-as-a-group, they
V .I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1971) at 76-77.
4One reason why the state must wither away is that it is expressed through law, the very form of 
which treats individuals like commodities, i.e. as existing only within a market in which they are 
freely interchangeable.
5David Theo Goldberg makes a persuasive case for the contrary position, the essential linkage of 
racism and liberalism, in Racist Culture (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1993). In this 
essay I take no position on whether liberalism necessarily generates racism. I do not, however, see 
any good reason to believe that the kinds of power relationships we now call racist did not find 
expression in pre-liberal times. Since I do not accept postmodernism’s conveniently limited anti- 
essentialism, I am willing to entertain the notion that racism as presently constructed shares 
something important, if only a family resemblance, with earlier forms of oppression based on tribe, 
skin colour, or place of origin.
may actually further those differences by providing a dominant discourse of law, 
politics and morality in which equality is identical to abstract(ed) equality.
It follows from these critiques that the application of liberal, rational ideals to 
legal education may, or perhaps even must, perpetuate the inequalities embodied 
in the non-liberal systems of domination. This is not to say, of course, that 
consistent application of liberal ideals to legal education is wholly without benefit. 
Liberal consistency guarantees that the same standards of access and achievement 
apply to members of dominant and subordinated groups, and this is a marked 
improvement over the illiberal application of different or even arbitrary standards 
which effectively exclude members of subordinated groups. As the faces and 
minds of my students change in ways that reflect backgrounds and identities which 
function to disempower people within systems of domination — woman, black, gay, 
working-class, etc. — how am I to respond if not by ignoring the differences, 
pretending they do not matter? That is what the WGL does. He tries to think 
and act as though individuals do not have a gender, race, or sexual orientation 
since he honestly believes that these characteristics are legally, politically, morally 
and educationally irrelevant. He aspires to teach people, not women, men, black 
women, poor gay men, etc.
WGLs are told, however, that blindness to race, gender, etc. will not do. We 
must reform our language, books and syllabi to be inclusive. We must be sensitive 
to the differential effects we have on people with diverse backgrounds. We must 
acknowledge our privilege no matter how hard we may have worked to achieve our 
positions. We must not presume to speak for non-WGLs, nor should we arrogantly 
impose WGL standards of speech, writing, argument, reasonableness, soundness, 
significance or truth on “others”. If the critics are to be believed, WGLs exclude 
and impose while being privileged, insensitive and arrogant.
WGLs’ response to this critique is to point out that we are perfectly willing to 
give up whatever true privileges we might have — fair opportunity is fundamental 
to liberalism — even if that means affirmative action. And our willingness to 
embrace a rich conception of fair or equal opportunity shows we are not 
insensitive and arrogant. Indeed, the inner life of the WGL is more one of guilt 
than arrogance: the political influence of liberal guilt leaves no doubt about the 
capacity of WGLs to aspire to sensitivity and “right attitudes”. But the critical 
theorists tell us that even if we were perfectly well intentioned and exquisitely 
sensitive we would nonetheless be incapable of adequately understanding the 
oppression from which we benefit. Our experience of oppression is abstract or 
disembodied, being an experience of privilege. WGLs do not have an immediate 
experience of oppression in the way that those who are oppressed do, for while 
being the subject of oppression is experienced individually, oppression is most 
frequently perpetrated systematically. WGLs benefit from the oppressive systems 
which effectively isolate them from the immediate, personal experience of that
oppression. For example, while the WGL law professor experiences a particular 
exchange with a student as exercising his role as teacher in a system of legal 
education, transmitting an understanding of legal relevance, his student may 
experience it as oppression in the form of devaluing or silencing the expression of 
her experience.
If this view is generalizable, the oppressed are necessarily in an 
epistemologically superior position to the oppressor. The WGL law professor 
cannot understand oppression in its most important aspect, as it is experienced. 
He is thus in a poor position to respond adequately to diversity in the classroom. 
Whatever his attitudes, his knowledge will be inadequate. He is, to use current 
language, “epistemically challenged”, a very distressing disability in a teacher. One 
might even be tempted to argue that such a mental disability goes to the very 
heart of the WGL’s competence as a professor. He may be a nice guy with a 
good attitude, but he is, quite simply, intellectually incompetent to cope with social 
diversity.
3 Emotion and Knowledge
This division of a person’s psyche into “attitude” or “emotion” and “knowledge” 
is common, even among those who reject liberalism and so-called modernism. 
These self-named “postmodern” critics argue that no amount of reform or 
manipulation of the former will assist the latter to the extent necessary for a sound 
analysis of oppression. The epistemological “situatedness” of the WGL is a near 
absolute which cannot be altered by “good attitude”. Exploring postmodern 
feminist and race theory, Peter Halewood summarizes the position in this way:
The problem is ultimately not one of malice or failure of empathy, but rather that 
certain epistemological perspectives on oppression are not inherently open to white 
male scholars. Attitude, intention, and empathy are subjective, alterable 
characteristics which certainly contribute to a scholar’s ability to comprehend 
oppression, but one’s epistemological perspective — the human categories of one’s 
experience — is fixed.6
This is a curious position indeed. Relapses into objectivism and essentialism 
aside, the postmodern view embraces one of the most troubling aspects of modern 
empiricism, the strict dichotomy of emotion (or attitude) and knowledge. This 
schism of feeling and thought can be traced to the ancient Greeks, if not earlier. 
It may be that the dichotomy is a characteristic of patriarchal thought generally, 
or it may be a result of the unique Greek scientific and artistic revolution which 
took place in the context of a vicious, militaristic patriarchal social system. This
*P. Halewood, “White Men Can’t Jump: Critical Epistemologies, Embodiment, and the Praxis of 
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is not the place to pursue these matters. It is enough to note that ancient Greece 
established the ground rules, as it were, for political, moral and legal theory in the 
West. For the purposes of this paper the most important of these are:
1. Reason is the final arbiter of truth and the sole basis for science.
Logos replaced Mythos as the dominant epistemological stance.
2. Reason and the knowledge it produces are universal and objective.
3. Rational science provides a better method for revealing the essential 
nature of human society than history, myth or art, since it alone produces
objective truth.
4. Rational science provides a model for the just or good society. Morality, 
law, politics and economics, the primary formal modes of regu la ting  social 
behaviour, can thus aspire to be sciences.
Reason and science excluded narrative, emotion and particularity, except as 
subjects for investigation. Emotion was the proper end or object of art, which was 
now firmly associated with fiction and illusion. Knowledge was the exclusive 
preserve of reason and science. If knowledge is then extended to human society 
and justice, social theory of all kinds must marginalize emotion. For the Greek 
rationalists and their many descendants, justice and goodness cannot be revealed 
by “mere feelings’, but must result from the proper application of reason.
Modem political thought modified these ancient beliefs and aspirations only 
to the extent of elevating the epistemological status of sensory experience. The 
modem scientific mind had become skeptical that reason could directly grasp 
universal truths about the natural world — the laws of nature — but it had 
abundant faith that the human mind could uncover these truths through rational 
manipulation of the data of our senses. Classical liberals, of course, continued to 
allow direct knowledge of very limited set of moral truths in the form of rights: 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident...” Thus in the social realm Stoic natural 
law was reduced to liberal human rights. The Republic became the liberal 
commonwealth, and economic efficiency became (con)fused with justice and 
goodness, but the state was to be based on rational models nonetheless. What did 
not change was the strict exclusion of “mere feelings” from a central role in 
understanding and guiding the just, efficient or otherwise good society.
Postmodern thought modifies the rationalist system of belief even further by 
rejecting the universal claims of reason and science while maintaining the primacy 
of experience. In a sense this completes the empiricist thrust toward the 
individual. But whereas the classical empiricist had faith that universal knowledge 
could arise from individual experience, the “postmodern empiricist” is content to
find the limits of knowledge in the limits of individual experience.7 S/he goes 
beyond old-fashioned relativism, however, by also insisting that all experience is 
socially “constructed”. In so doing postmodernism renders Greek-style justice and 
goodness impotent as social ideals. Even if we can know what is just and good, 
that knowledge does not transcend our society since knowledge is based in 
experience and experience is constructed by that very society. The WGL’s 
experience is the only possible basis for his knowledge of justice and goodness, but 
his experience is constructed by a system that privileges his position. The most he 
can hope is that the social system(s) which formed him can be made consistent in 
the expression of their ideology. Once consistency is attained, there can be no 
further grounds for criticism, no rational grounds for reform.
This broad-brush history offers little hope to the WGL. He is the helpless 
captive of a grand march of rationalist, patriarchal ideology over a period of at 
least twenty five hundred years. The non-WGL, on the other hand, is partially 
immunized against helplessness by the concrete particularity of her victimization 
or oppression. By virtue of their “otherness” non-white men, women of all 
colours, homosexuals, the disabled, etc. are free to rise above the dominant 
ideology, understanding it with an insight denied mere WGLs. Or so the story 
goes.
One response to this thesis of epistemic impotence and empowerment is to 
portray the WGL as a victim as well: white men are oppressed by the system too. 
We are all siblings in our common victimization by patriarchy, capitalism, racism 
and heterosexism. On this view, the WGL’s contribution to enlightenment ran 
then be his unique experience and understanding of his own oppression by “the 
system”. To the extent that social oppression shares a common “deep structure”, 
WGLs could then make a real contribution to understanding oppression of all 
kinds. I find this altogether too ingenuous. For example, the white man’s 
“victimhood” from sexual violence most often consists of “suffering” from his own 
lack of gentleness, love and trust, and his fear for the safety of the women in his 
life. But as a child he was much less likely than his sister to be sexually abused 
by a relative, and as an adult he is much less likely to be beaten by a spouse. His 
racial, and other, “victimhood” is similarly vacuous. He is unlikely to be 
considered lazy, dumb, unreliable, and prone to drunkenness, rape and violence 
because of the colour of his skin. He walks the streets and enters the boardrooms
7Professor Sherene Razack points out that “postmodern empiricist” might appear to be a
contradiction in terms. The classical empiricist believes that human experience is universal_
essentially the same for everyone — and that from it objective knowledge can be derived. The 
postmodernist believes neither of these things; experience is socially constructed, and knowledge is 
always situated within a limited set of social conditions. There is, however, a continuity I wish to 
emphasize. Both accept the epistemological centrality of individual experience: knowledge comes 
from (and is limited by) an individual’s experience.
of the nation with an assurance and safety unknown to women and non-whites. 
His “victimhood” is of a very peculiar kind indeed.
4 Instrumentalism and Wisdom
If WGL law professors cannot realistically find solidarity in victimhood with the 
increasingly diverse student body, what can they do? Are there unseen, or at least 
unused, options in the tradition? I believe so. The one which I shall consider 
here can be found in virtually all historical periods and in a wide variety of 
cultures. It is the tradition of wisdom. Admittedly this does not look like a very 
promising start. Wisdom is out of fashion. It seems more appropriate to another 
era, one less complex and dynamic. Ours is an age of knowledge, power and 
change, an age in which the intellect is measured by what it can do or accomplish, 
by the diseases it conquers, the Nobel prizes it garners, the gross national product 
it generates, the number of articles it publishes, the career it pursues. We are in 
the age of the instrumental intellect, and the final purpose or goal of mind is 
power: mastery over the world, others and even ourselves.
The instrumental view of mind is quite at home in the classroom, of course. 
More and more today the university is treated instrumentally. Students want 
marketable skills, business wants trained and compliant workers, and political 
discourse demands efficient contribution to the gross national product. Not 
unexpectedly, the pressures toward instrumental education are especially intense 
in law and other “professional” schools.
Not only is the educational mission of the university instrumentalized, but its 
scholarly, intellectual enterprise is similarly imbued with an instrumental ethic. 
The funding of departments and faculties depends on scholarly output: number 
and size of grants, number of books and “peer reviewed” articles, positions of 
power in national or international scholarly or research organizations, and so on. 
The motivational techniques of the modern university as an institution embody this 
instrumentalism: the appropriate end products have been made part of academic 
careers, the psychological space within which professors are assumed, or expected, 
to operate. Among other things, careers are institutionalized — indeed, ritualized
— systems of social power constructed to ensure a level of worker commitment, 
compliance and effort which the base activity/product would not otherwise attract. 
In exchange for money, institutional power and recognition, professors are directed 
toward the appropriate scholarly output.8
8One of the most detrimental results of the insitutionalized academic career is its tendency to 
convert communities of scholars into adversarial, competitive hierarchies.
As if the incentives to instrumental intellect were not enough to guarantee its 
ascendance, strong social pressures also work against the inclusion of wisdom and 
non-instrumental intellect in the academy. The very mention of wisdom in an 
academic setting is more likely to cause embarrassment than excited discussion. 
Even philosophers seem reluctant to mention wisdom after the first class of 
Philosophy 101. Wisdom is as unwelcome in a university as justice is in a law 
school. And yet wisdom and justice are the most worthy of goals and the most 
precious of attainments. How can a society which does not value wisdom and 
justice hope to find any degree of harmony in the diversity of its citizens? And if 
members of the university community do not value wisdom and justice, who can 
be expected to do so?
The university is most fundamentally a society of learning — not of teaching, 
not of research, not of academic careers, and certainly not of government grants 
or training the work force or enhancing competitiveness. It would seem more than 
a little strange that a society of learning would eschew learning those things which 
are most precious. And yet much in the university conspires to drive out, or at 
least underground, the dreams of learning what really matters. The instrumentalist 
ideology leaves little room for the gentler ideologies of wisdom. If we think of the 
university as a society devoted to teaching and/or research — goals which are easily 
understood in instrumentalist terms — it is not at all strange that wisdom and 
justice should find thin soil here. It is unlikely that wisdom and justice themselves 
can be taught or discovered, even though examining the results of folly and 
injustice fuel the academy.
5 The Nature of Wisdom
What do I mean by “wisdom”? I can attempt only the barest sketch here. When 
we think of people whom we would consider truly wise, what characteristics do we 
find? The physical attributes of the person are irrelevant: wisdom is as compatible 
with physical weakness, deformity, ugliness and decrepitude as with strength, 
perfect form, beauty and vitality. Intellectual characteristics such as problem­
solving intelligence, wit, eloquence, business acumen, devastating debating skil1; 
encyclopedic knowledge of the law and so on are similarly neither necessary nor 
sufficient for wisdom. “World class” scholars and scientists are probably no more 
likely to be wise than subsistence farmers in Africa or street sweepers in South 
Asia.
Nonetheless, wisdom is an attribute or attainment of mind. It does not appear 
to be an inborn skill, or a skill acquired at an early age. Children are sometimes 
musical or mathematical prodigies, but never wisdom prodigies. Wisdom is most 
often associated with age, or more precisely, with experience, although sometimes 
a relatively young person is touched by the divine and exhibits an unexpected
degree of wisdom. It seems to involve knowledge, but knowledge of a peculiar 
sort: an active, embodied knowledge of the significance of those things which 
determine the meaning and value of life. For example, the wise person knows that 
love is more important in human life than money or political power. But while 
many may say this, the wise have made it part of their very being. The wise 
person is characterized by an integration of thought and feeling, intellect and 
emotion, the very thing denigrated by the rationalist tradition with its suspicion of 
emotion.
Wisdom is not limited to the “big things” like love and death. It also 
encompasses innumerable “little things”: the flower growing through a crack in an 
abandoned parking lot, the smell of babies and warm dogs, the beauty of countless 
stars on a dear night, the rustle of leaves on a summer evening, the silent 
communication between long-married people, the inevitability of a Beethoven 
sonata, the shock and sorrow for an animal killed on the road, and so on. The 
wise among us experience these things from a perspective or in a manner 
appropriate to a life fully lived. The wise person exhibits a harmony of thought, 
feeling, knowledge and activity embodying those values which constitute goodness 
in human life. To use a current expression, most of us “just don’t get it” when it 
comes to living a good life, a life fully human. The wise person does “get it”, and 
lives a life fitting for a human being.
I take this one step further. I believe that the truly wise show an integration 
of thought, emotion and sense of appropriateness which embodies a specific set 
of values. These are the gentler values, the values of love, compassion, concern, 
care, kindness, respect, responsibility, non-violence, humility and the like.9 To the 
extent that we think of Hildegard of Bingen, the Biblical prophets, Jesus, 
Mohammed, the Buddha and innumerable others as wise, we think of them as 
compassionate, loving, concerned or something of the sort. To say, “She is a very 
wise woman, but cruel, inconsiderate and filled with hate,” is to utter sheer
9It is difficult to find a single term which adequately captures the moral content of wisdom. Some 
of the terms that come to mind have histories of abuse in which they are implicated in 
relationships of domination: compassion has been used as an excuse, and even a justification, for 
imposing Western values on supposedly “underdeveloped” peoples, and respect (as in “equal 
respect”) is a crucial part of contract theories and Kantian style rationalist ethics. Others are 
incomplete: non-violence is too limited in scope, and kindness is too passive. Still others have 
inappropriate connotations: humility too often suggests weakness, and love too often suggests 
Dionysian excess or erotic forces. “Care”, as used by Carol Gilligan and other feminists, may be 
developing an appropriate sense, but it remains saddled with a long history of women’s duty to 
“care for” others, thus making it easy to dismiss as part of a “morality of oppression”. In the end 
it may be impossible to find a single term which adequately covers the moral core of wisdom. It 
does not follow from this that there is no moral core, however. There may well be a family 
resemblance between the various concepts which inadequately express that core, a resemblance 
that has no name other than “wisdom”. This is not the place to investigate these conceptual 
details.
nonsense. Great intelligence and knowledge are perfectly compatible with 
callousness, cruelty, malice and hate, but wisdom is not. Wisdom involves a moral 
element, and in particular care, love, compassion, kindness or something similar. 
The Buddha would not be the Buddha were he not compassionate. Care for the 
homeless, the widowed, the orphaned and the stranger is not an accidental part 
of the wisdom literature of the Bible or the teachings of Jesus and others in the 
prophetic tradition. The high spirits and testosterone of youth may lead us into 
reckless battle over trivial pieces of land and vanishingly small differences of belief, 
but only folly — lack of wisdom — can explain such actions among older people. 
Violence, cruelty, greed, intolerance and hatred are failures of wisdom. And they 
are failures of wisdom in a wide variety of cultures.
6 Dare to be Wise10
6.1 Wisdom and Social Relations
Even this brief discussion should make it clear why wisdom receives so little 
formal recognition in our social institutions. Its very essence includes the 
unification of thought, emotion, value and action. The rationalist tradition, 
including the rationalist tradition of legal, moral and political thought, has insisted 
on marginalizing emotion and rationalizing value and action.11 Yet appropriate 
attitude, emotion or appreciation is essential to wisdom: Knowledge alone 
completely misses the point of the flower in the parking lot or the significance of 
those leaves rustling on that night.
iaThe title of this section comes from a lovely essay of the same name by Richard Taylor, 
originally written for philosophy students at the University of Rochester and later published in The 
Review of Metaphysics XXI, No. 4 (June 1968), 615. Professor Taylor borrowed the title from 
McTaggart (presumably John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart). The phrase is perhaps best known in 
its Latin form sapere aude. Anne Crocker, the Law Librarian at UNB, and Professor Thomas 
Kuttner both reminded me that in this form it constitutes the motto of the University of New 
Brunswick. In a wonderful example of scholarly process, Professor Kuttner then talked with 
Professor William Kerr of the Department of Classics about the origins of the phrase. Being 
pressed for time, Professor Kerr phoned Mary Flagg of the Harriet Irving Library at UNB, and in 
approximately five minutes Ms. Flagg provided the following source:
Dimidium facti qui coepit habet: sapere aude: 
incipe.
S/he who begins has done half the work: dare to be wise: 
begin!
Horace Epistles 1.2 1140-41.
Horace was urging a young person to study philosophy.
nThose few philosophers who have based ethics on emotion have either insisted that it be only the 
raw material for a rational process — utilitarianism, for example — or have given up any pretense 
to truth or universality in ethics — emotivism, for example.
For modernists and other rationalist thinkers, compassion, love, kindness, etc. 
ran be nothing more than devices of social coordination with survival value, or 
something similar. These gentle motives and experiences may even divert us from 
doing our “duty” as demanded by governments, corporations and other 
institutions. Kant, the greatest rationalist of them all, thought that compassion and 
other “inclinations” were at best irrelevant to the moral value of action, which 
should be done solely for the sake of duty.12 From the perspective of the 
rationalist tradition, compassion and emotions generally are anarchic. They 
represent the wild, untamed forces of chaos which must be controlled by reason. 
As a practical matter, the wise person can be tolerated in our rational society as 
long as her wisdom does not corrupt the youth into thinking we should be kind to 
enemies, open and generous to the weak and humble, or gentle as we walk in the 
land. Should the youth succumb to the siren call of the Luddites, tree-huggers, 
vegetarian purveyors of Bambiism and witches of pagan wisdom, “progress” would 
cease, we would be helpless before our enemies and our economy would collapse.
The wisdom tradition is at odds with postmodernism as well. While 
postmodernists are fond of trashing rationalism in the name of individual 
experience, they are at the same time perfectly willing to subjugate that individual 
experience to systems of social power. Individual experience can at best reveal 
knowledge that is true-for-me-as-constructed-by-my-society. Perhaps such 
knowledge can extend the breadth of a society, but certainly can go no further. 
For the postmodernist, the individual is epistemologically and axiologically13 
limited by culture, tribe or clan. To maintain the impotence of the individual 
outside of her immediate clan, and thereby castrate current power elites, the 
postmodernist is driven to reject the very features of mind or soul which hold 
promise for connecting one culture or “situation” with another: the gentle 
emotions such as love, compassion and care. Mere attitude, the postmodernist 
says, cannot generate true understanding of, or experience of, oppression and 
other cultures, and without such understanding and experience we can neither 
criticize others nor overcome our own prejudices and oppressive systems.
By refusing to isolate knowledge and feelings or emotions, wisdom threatens 
this neat method of shifting power, or moral status, from the “elites” to the 
“oppressed”. Wisdom does not fit into the patriarchal game of them-versus-us 
politics. It offers hope of meaningful association, if not actual transcendence of 
difference. Postmodernism, on the other hand, can offer only self-defeat as long 
as it continues to embrace adversarial politics. Oppositional, group-against-group 
politics contains the deep structure of all oppressive systems: sexism, racism, 
classism, etc. Unfortunately, postmodernism itself does not derive from a political
12EL Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, first published in 1785.
13The postmodernist views feelings of right and wrong as socially constructed, and hence situated, 
as well.
vision incompatible with adversarial competition. It is, at best, only part of the 
answer to oppression.
The postmodern defeat of reason — and hence the oppression of “modernism”
— merely releases the forces and systems of hatred without dissolving them. The 
postmodernist skeptic may be correct in dismissing the power of reason to 
overcome hatred, which, incidentally, is not necessarily evil in a postmodern world. 
But that does not justify us in believing that hatred is solely a product of reason, 
and so will disappear once reason is defrocked. The forces and systems of hatred, 
cruelty, callousness and malice need to be replaced by forces and systems of love, 
kindness, concern and compassion. But this cannot be done as long as the 
separation of thought and emotion is maintained in political, legal and moral 
thought. We can find the unification, or at least serious attempts at such 
unification, in the ancient and continuing wisdom tradition. Indeed, it is tempting 
to see the wisdom tradition as a kind of feminist underground in which a pre- 
patriarchal unity of thought and feeling is preserved, though perhaps in distorted 
ways.
There are two reasons to believe wisdom might provide social bridges between 
people of different cultures, groups and power, even between WGLs and all the 
“others”. First, the gentle values of love, compassion, generosity and kindness 
embodied in wisdom are found as a group in so many different cultures throughout 
history that it seems extremely unlikely that it is mere accident. It is as though 
these values are inter-related at a deep level which involves something profound 
about the nature of humans or perhaps all conscious beings. That this “deep 
system” of love or gentleness is an insistent part of human life is evidenced by the 
enormous resources expended all over the world on socialization, training and 
propaganda plainly calculated to ensure that kindness does not break out between 
individuals and spoil the plans of war and petty political rivalry. Patriarchal, racist, 
nationalist cultures show a continuing need to suppress a tendency toward kindness 
that transcends those cultures of hate.
Not only are compassion and the gentler virtues the recurrent nightmares of 
hatemongers everywhere, but they would win a fair popularity contest in virtually 
any society. Although cruelty, callousness and hatred are as much a part of human 
“nature” as kindness, compassion and love, there are very few people in any 
culture or any era who would suggest that the former are preferable to the latter, 
other things being equal. It is thus not unreasonable to assume that the gentler 
values will be shared by people of different genders, races, cultures etc. However 
else we may differ, we probably agree on this: kindness is better than cruelty; love 
is better than hate; gentleness is better than violence; compassion is better than 
malice; and so on.
The second reason for believing that gentle values may bridge cultures, 
genders, races, etc., is that they express themselves in ways which diminish barriers 
and help connect, if not unify, perspectives. It is not accidental that we advise 
people who want to understand a confusing book to “read it sympathetically”. 
Only when we open our hearts to others can our minds be open as well. And 
because the gentle virtues and values are nearly universally honoured, when we 
approach others in this spirit they are more likely to respond in kind. Once the 
respect and concern is mutual, suspicion, fear, defensive stubbornness and other 
blocks to understanding tend to diminish. At the same time, mutual concern and 
respect undercut hierarchy and the disrespect, arrogance, insensitivity and so on 
that tend to thrive in such settings.14 Gentleness is more likely to yield mutual 
understanding than competition, aggression, cool reason, or any other common 
approach.
62 The Discipline of Kindness13
The kind, compassionate, caring, concerned and respectful stance of the wise 
person is as important a base for understanding others as objective observation 
and analysis, the stance of the rationalist. And just as observation and analysis are 
best treated not as isolated, individual acts but as parts of an intellectual discipline 
(typically a science), so kindness, caring, love and compassion are best treated not 
as isolated, individual acts, but as parts of something more: something more 
demanding, more difficult, more fruitful. Perhaps it sounds odd to speak of a 
“discipline of kindness”, or a “discipline of love”, but we all know how difficult 
and demanding kindness and love can be. The impulsive act of kindness is a 
blessing to everyone when it hits the mark, but kindness demands more than this. 
It grips our soul and transforms us. It sets other desires, other projects, other 
values along-side our own and asks us to embrace them. I may be ignorant of 
what these “other” projects and desires are, but kindness demands that I take 
them into account nonetheless. They may even conflict with my own. No matter; 
kindness demands that they not be treated as “other” but be mixed with my own. 
Among other things, to be wise is to embody this discipline, or these disciplines, 
of kindness, compassion, respect, love and so on.
14Perhaps the major reason why political power is said to “corrupt” people is that it places them in 
positions in which the virtues of wisdom are strongly discouraged while the aggressive, adversarial 
virtues are applauded. Most modem political systems are designed to accommodate political 
authority modelled in some degree on that of the patriarchal God-King-Father.
^In this section I refer most frequently to the discipline of kindness rather than love, compassion 
or other relations primarily for the sake of simplicity and clarity. “Kindness” carries somewhat 
less cultural baggage than the other terms while still clearly embodying the root social or political 
value(s) of wisdom. “Discipline of wisdom” might seem to be the most accurate title, but it lacks 
intuitive presence for most people, in addition to covering elements beyond the social or political.
The relevance of this to diversity in the classroom should be obvious. Wisdom, 
with its discipline of care, provides both a common ground on which individuals 
can meet in the study of legal materials and a mode of interaction which 
maximizes the likelihood of mutual understanding. Wisdom itself cannot be 
taught, of course, as philosophers have noted since the time of Socrates. Not even 
parents can teach their children to be wise. Certainly law professors cannot teach 
it to law students, even if they are themselves wise. But a commitment to wisdom 
and justice as well as analytic rigour and “professionalism” can have a m eaningful 
impact on both the “product” and the “process” of legal education.
Although wisdom cannot be taught, it does not follow that it cannot be 
learned. How is it learned? I have already suggested that it is learned from, or 
at least as a result of, experience. What is the most common method of teaching 
and learning law? The case method. And what is a case if not a story, a story of 
problems, conflict, responsibility and resolution? As I argue elsewhere, stories or 
narratives are devices whereby humans expand their experience without the normal 
costs and risks. The legal case is an opportunity to enter into a different world, 
a different set of experiences, from the relative safety of a classroom. While it 
cannot have the impact of actual experience, it need not be wholly void of the 
effects of such experience. If we refuse to over-intellectualize cases and thereby 
strip them of their individual/personal and social contexts, they provide all of the 
materials needed to vicariously expand our experience in ways that call upon 
justice and wisdom.
If we are willing to flesh out at least some of the cases and engage our “wise 
emotions” — our love, compassion, respect, concern, etc. — as we consider them, 
we provide a common framework in which diverse individuals seek, and probably 
find, common ground. The cases are more than expressions of authority. They 
are our laboratories of vicarious experience in which we and our students are 
asked to be wise as well as just and rigorously analytic. If I am right that there 
is a more-or-less common core of values and insights among the wise of all 
cultures and backgrounds, the search for wisdom and justice in the materials of 
legal study can help provide a degree of commonality which might otherwise be 
missing among those separated by “difference”, that is by oppressive power.
At the same time, the study of law, both inside and outside the classroom, is 
part of our experience, and thus itself calls upon us to practise justice and wisdom. 
If the very atmosphere of the classroom and the school is antithetical to the gentle 
values of wisdom, we diminish the opportunities for mutual understanding only 
they make possible, while betraying our own commitment to wisdom. If we are 
wise in our treatment of students -- if we are responsible and treat them with 
concern, kindness, compassion and, yes, even love — we maximize the likelihood 
of taking the intellectual sting out of power and privilege, and of bringing down
the barriers of hurt and protectiveness which make understanding extremely 
difficult. Wisdom is good educational strategy.16
However misguided and inadequate the WGL tradition might be, with its 
extreme emphasis on abstraction, universality, and reason, it has been 
accompanied in its long history by a companion tradition of wisdom. The 
canonized version of wisdom preserved by rabbinic Judaism formed the basis for 
an important part of our modern conception of justice, and allowed the basic 
conception of wisdom to find a place, albeit a small one, in the dominant Christian 
church.17
16The search for wisdom has yet another benefit in the academy. Because wisdom involves 
kindness, care, compassion, love and the like, it offers some hope of bypassing the practical 
difficulties of “intersectionality” in a way not open to “rational”, ruled-based approaches. The 
gentle emotions constitute specific relationships between individuals. We cannot meaningfully be 
kind to categories or classes of people. We can only truly be compassionate, loving or kind to 
individuals. So no matter how the intersectionality problem is resolved, wisdom ties us to the 
uniqueness of a specific intersection not only of race, gender, class and sexual orientation, but also 
of family, physical stature, beauty, intelligence, brain chemistry, health, hopes, humour, and all the 
other things that make each of us unique. The discipline of care tells us that all of these factors, 
the ‘private’ as well as the overtly ‘political’, may well be relevant to that person’s learning 
experience in law school. These things may equally well be relevant to understanding the 
individuals about whom we tell our law-stories or cases. The very practice of wisdom undercuts 
the politicization by patriarchy, capitalism, heterosexism, racism, nationalism, etc. of only a very 
narrow range of categories or properties of individuals. At the same time, of course, because 
wisdom involves caring it cannot be blind to the special significance of those politicized differences 
which constitute the interdependent systems of oppression. The wise must respond to the 
politically ‘real’ while simultaneously seeing through it to the more complex individual.
17The wise person probably plays a more important formal or quasi-formal role in Judaism than 
Christianity. The wisdom tradition of the “Old Testament” continued to be part of Judaism while 
finding little resonance in a “New Testament” Christianity fixated on sin, salvation and 
deliverance. Professor Thomas Kuttner has suggested to me that some of this difference may be 
explained by Christianity’s emphasis on believing a particular creed, this a result of struggling to 
define and distinguish itself from other religious sects at the time of its formation. The central 
expression of the Christian’s faith is a set of beliefs about God, Jesus, sin, salvation, etc. The 
central expression of Jewish faith is participation in a community life imbued with a unifying set of 
traditions and values. In “Constitution as Covenant” (1988) 13 (2) Queen’s L. R. 32 at 44-45, 
Professor Kuttner puts it this way:
[W]hereas under the Covenant of old is forged a community of faith, under the new 
is bom a community of th& faithful. There is much in the tenor and language of the 
two Covenants which testifies to this difference of thrust, perhaps nothing more 
clearly so than the profession of faith of each: “Shema‘ Yisrael... Hear, Oh Israel the 
Lord is our God, the Lord is one” in the old; “Credo in unum Deum I  believe in 
one God, the Father Almighty...” in the new.
Since participation in a living tradition — acting rather than believing — is a central part of Jewish 
identity, wisdom, with its appropriate integration of thought, feeling, sense of significance and 
action is more important to Jewish identity than Christian. In this regard Christianity is sharply 
distinguished from Islam as well. It is probably not accidental that Christianity provided the
Wisdom thus maintained some small formal recognition in the dominant Western 
culture. Outside of formal structures, of course, wisdom plays an ongoing role in 
everyday life not limited to the any particular group. It knows no limits of class, 
culture, nation, religious sect, gender, ability or sexual orientation. It is part of the 
tradition of nearly everyone, including WGLs.
If WGLs along with everyone were to recognize and embrace the traditions 
of wisdom which have long coexisted with Stoic-liberalism, diversity in society and 
within the classroom might not present an impenetrable wall to understanding and 
justice. We need to recognize that the rationalist tradition must be supplemented 
in the classroom and in politics, as it is in “private” life, by wisdom. We must 
once again dare to be wise. The disciplines of kindness, compassion, love and 
justice must once more become part of the discipline of law as they were long ago 
for the prophets of ancient Israel and, most likely, for the mothers of 
prepatriarchal society. The white-guy liberal can play a role in this along with the 
most “post” of postmodernists and the most “pressed” of the oppressed. Wisdom 
and justice reach out to everyone. Reason alone cannot unite a diverse society, 
for it cannot distinguish diversity (equality) from difference (hierarchy). Only 
when wisdom is set along-side reason do we have any hope of reaching Jerusalem, 
the promised land of harmony, peace and justice.
cultural context in which individual identity could be sufficiently isolated from the community for 
modem liberal capitalism to take root.
